Creating DRP (Disaster Recovery Plan) is an essential need for every firm, simply because disasters do happen.
Defining and creating the DRP isn’t an easy task especially for IT, but the basics remain the same:
Identify the critical sectors, assess the risks and prepare the plans in advance.
below is a case study made on Hurricane Katrina & the Port of New-Orleans:

Emergency type effects on SCM function and activities in critical infrastructure sector.

by Raphael Gal

1. Case study – Hurricane Katrina 2005

Hurricane Katrina was the most destructive and costliest natural disaster in the history of the United States, and the deadliest hurricane since the 1928 Okeechobee Hurricane. Along its path, the storm claimed more than 1,836 lives and caused an estimated $75 billion dollars in damage As of July 2006, almost a year after the storm, more than a thousand people remain missing.

The hurricane left an estimated three million people without electricity, and more than 90,000 square miles (233,000 km²) were declared disaster areas.

     The beginnings of what would become Hurricane Katrina developed on August 23, 2005, over the southeastern Bahamas as Tropical Depression 12. The system quickly grew, becoming Tropical Storm Katrina less than 18 hours after first being classified. As it developed, the storm moved westward, attaining hurricane strength on August 25 less than two hours before making landfall near Aventura, Florida as a Category 1 storm. The interaction with the land weakened the storm slightly; however, upon emerging over the Gulf of Mexico, Katrina quickly regained hurricane force and continued west. Due in part to its path over the warm Loop Current in the Gulf, Katrina underwent steady and rapid intensification, becoming the third major hurricane of the season. An eyewall replacement cycle temporarily disrupted development, but nearly doubled the size of the storm. Katrina again intensified rapidly, attaining Category 5 status by August 28 and reaching its peak strength later that day with maximum sustained winds of 175 mph and a minimum central pressure of 902 mbar. The pressure made Katrina the fourth most intense Atlantic hurricane on record. As Hurricane Katrina neared the Gulf Coast, the storm weakened in intensity; however the wind field continued to expand, making Katrina one of the largest major hurricanes ever to strike the United States. Katrina made its second landfall near Buras, Louisiana at 6:10 a.m.CDT on August 29 as a Category 3 Hurricane with sustained winds of 125 mph. At landfall, hurricane-force winds extended outward 120 miles from the center and the storm’s central pressure was 920 mbar. After moving over southeastern Louisiana and Breton Sound, the storm made its third landfall near the Louisiana/Mississippi border with 120 mph winds and a catastrophic 27-foot (estimated) storm surge. The surge appears to have penetrated at least six miles inland in many portions of coastal Mississippi and up to 12 miles inland along bays and rivers. The surge crossed Interstate 10 in many locations. Katrina produced a lesser but still very significant storm surge along the eastern Gulf coast of Mississippi and Alabama. The storm surge was about 10 feet as far east as Mobile, Alabama where Katrina caused flooding several miles inland along Mobile Bay. Although the brunt of the initial effects of Hurricane Katrina were felt along the Mississippi Coast to the east of the eye of the storm, a significant storm surge also affected the area to the west of the landfall, including Lake Pontchartrain in Louisiana.

    The height of the surge is uncertain because tide gauge observations along the southeastern coast of Louisiana were limited and incomplete. As the level of Lake Pontchartrain rose, several feet of water were pushed into communities along its northeastern shore from Slidell to Mandeville, Louisiana. The surge severely strained the levee system in the New Orleans area, which began to fail as early as the morning of the August 29. Breaches in levees along the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet (MRGO), the Industrial Canal, the 17th Street Canal, and the London Avenue Canal led to the flooding (up to 20 feet in depth) of about 80 percent of New Orleans proper and all of adjacent St. Bernard Parish. According to the Army Corps of Engineers, it was not until 43 days after Katrina’s landfall that all of the resulting floodwaters were pumped from the city.

Transportation:

When Hurricane Katrina came ashore on the morning of August 29, it had a devastating impact on much of the transportation infrastructure of extreme southern Mississippi and Louisiana and Alabama. The most significant impacts were to the numerous bay and river crossings throughout the region, which were damaged by the storm’s considerable storm surge and wave action. In some coastal sections prominent elements of the transportation network remained closed many months after the storm.

Highway damage from Katrina was not limited to Louisiana and Mississippi. Although Mobile Bay (just east of Mobile, Alabama) lies more than 100 miles east of New Orleans, bridges there also were damaged and displaced by a record high 12-foot storm surge.

        As for rails, when Katrina came ashore, it had a significant impact on a number of key railroad facilities, bridges, and rights-of-way. Much of the rail infrastructure in extreme southern Mississippi and Louisiana took weeks or months to repair. The brunt of storm damage was taken by Cost’s Gulf Coast Line between New Orleans and Mobile. Although the costs to repair the infrastructure were reported to be substantial, overall losses of operating revenue were minimized because redundancy in the east-west rail network allowed trains to be routed through other gateways.

       Many of the ports in the Central Gulf Coast region sustained significant damage from Hurricane Katrina. Due to their low-lying locations, the ports were susceptible to damage from all effects of the hurricane—high winds, heavy rains, and especially the storm surge. As much as these initial consequences affected port operations, prolonged power outages, waterway obstructions, and labor shortages were just as detrimental to efforts to resume operation. But confounding initial expectations that it would take a year for many ports to reopen, almost all ports in the Central Gulf Coast were able to reopen and provide services within a month of Katrina’s landfall.

       A number of airports in the study area received significant damage from the strong winds, flooding rains and embedded tornadoes associated with Hurricane Katrina. Airports sustained damage to passenger terminals, maintenance facilities, and navigational devices. Power outages also took air traffic control facilities off-line and darkened nighttime runway lights. As a result, some airports were closed for days and weeks while necessary repairs could be made, but relief flights were flown in before the airport facilities were fully reopened.

Sewer & Waste-water:

Sewage treatment plants in the Gulf Coast region became inoperable when their pumps and generators were submerged in saltwater and damaged. Most plants were without power for several weeks. Damage to pump stations resulted primarily from flooding of pump motors, controllers, power panels, and back-up power diesel generators.

   Generally, wastewater plants are located in low-lying areas; as a result, many are in exposed locations that are prone to flooding. The plants sustained varying levels of damage, depending on the elevation of the process unit, pumps, and motors above grade, and to a lesser degree, on plant design.

 In Mississippi, wastewater plants built since 1969 have site elevations based on flood levels experienced during Hurricane Camille (1969). Witnesses to both Hurricane Camille and Hurricane Katrina estimates that the surge level exceeded that of Hurricane Camille by 6 feet to 12 feet.

    The New Orleans East bank Wastewater Treatment Facility experienced significant damage to pump equipment. This facility was underwater for approximately three weeks. Flood levels were estimated to be about 16 feet above ground level. Louisiana State Department of Transportation pumps along the 17th Street Canal were damaged by high floodwaters, which reached about three feet in depth.

Telecommunication:

All public works agencies, utility companies, vital commercial entities, and emergency responders were hampered by widespread loss of communications capabilities during the hurricane and to varying degrees for days and weeks afterward. While most communications infrastructure survived and much of the damage has been repaired, lingering communications outages at the time of the reconnaissance continued to hamper the recovery efforts.

Both land line and cellular telephone service were severely disrupted in surge and waves regions (Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas) and regions where aerial lines and poles were downed by wind, debris, and falling trees (Louisiana, Texas). All land line service in the area was interrupted for at least brief periods during and after the storm.

    The major disruptions to radio and television communication services were due to loss of electrical power. There was at least one case of structural failure: WLOX-TV in Biloxi, Mississippi went off the air because its broadcast tower collapsed when the guy wire anchors were pulled out of the ground.

Water:

Mississippi coastal communities obtain their water from city-owned and -operated deep wells located throughout the communities, generally in individual neighborhoods and developed areas. There are no water treatment plants and no surface treatment of water, as the excellent water quality requires only chlorination. Each well site has an electrical pump and a chlorine injection system, while some sites have backup generators. The cities provide fresh water to residents and businesses through a system of lift stations, elevated storage tanks, and distribution piping. All of the regional systems were shut down for several days because of loss of electrical power. There was no damage to the elevated tanks throughout the region and little damage to water mains.

     There was significant damage, however, to water well equipment and distribution piping due to storm surge and waves. In addition to the loss of electrical service, restoration of water service was hampered by the scope of damage, difficulty in gaining access to cut-off valves due to debris, and insufficient repair part inventories to respond to an event of such magnitude as Hurricane Katrina. Restoration of service was further challenged by the loss of system pressure due to massive damage to distribution networks at the user level.

Electric power:

Mississippi Power Company, a subsidiary of Southern Company, provides electricity in the southern third of the state (Gulfport to Meridian), the area affected by Hurricane Katrina. Mississippi Power serves primarily municipal areas, whereas rural areas are served by electric power cooperatives. Some 200,000 Mississippi Power customers lost power as a result of Hurricane Katrina. Recovery operations were further hindered by the loss of the use of corporate offices in Gulfport due to water infiltration. Linkage to the 800 MHz Southern Company link allowed good communications for Mississippi Power repair crews in the immediate aftermath of the storm, and also provided alternatives to landline and cellular telephone services for local government agencies and other responders.

     Overall, Mississippi reported that 402 cable support towers were broken, leaning, or required major work to repair damaged conductors, insulators and switchgear.

In most cases, the damage was attributed to trees falling on equipment, windborne debris, and the effects of wind whipping the lines against insulators and equipment. In some instances, line failures resulted in cascading tower collapses due to unbalanced line tension. Electrical service was restored throughout most of the service area within 10 days after the storm.

   Entergy is the main power company in New Orleans, southern Louisiana and east Texas. Entergy suffered significant damage to its distribution and transmission structures, as well as some flooding at power stations. It was reported that in excess of one million distribution poles were lost in the two hurricanes, with the main loss attributed to tree fall, storm surge, and waves. Around 800,000 customer suffered from electricity outage.

     Many transmission lines in Mississippi, southern Louisiana, and east Texas were affected by Hurricanes Katrina. Following Hurricane Katrina, there were only two power lines energized in southern Mississippi, and both were fed from Alabama. Power available from those lines could not be routed to the affected area due to the extensive damage to transmission lines.

The lack of interconnection with less affected power companies in east Texas led to delays in reestablishing electric power in that region.

   Mississippi Power has three major generating plants in the region:

• Watson Electric Generating Plant (Plant Watson
• Daniel Electric Generating Plant (Plant Daniel)
• Chevron Pascagoula Refinery COGEN (Chevron COGEN)

   The Chevron COGEN and Plant Daniel suffered only minor damage to buildings, cooling towers, and auxiliary equipment from wind and flooding. Service was restored quickly at both generating plants. As a result of having raised the height of the protective levees and electrical equipment after Hurricane Georges in 1998, the plants reported a lower level of flooding and flood impacts than they had experienced in past hurricanes.

   Plant Watson, however, experienced flooding of critical pumps and controllers, which were below flood level. This led to long delays in cleanup, repair, and re-start. A major problem in getting Plant Watson back on line was the lack of electric power needed for startup of the auxiliary equipment. Under normal conditions, power is available from alternate sources, but in this case, the entire regional system was down. Entergy’s Neches River power station near

    Port Arthur, TX had to be shut down when its major transmission lines were damaged and/or downed. In addition, cooling tower shrouds and fans were ripped away by extreme wind, as was some cladding on the station itself. The Entergy power station at Sulphur, near Lake Charles, LA, also lost transmission capability when several 500 kV lattice towers collapsed.

Gas:

Because major gas system components were underground, there was no reported damage. Gas service was not affected by the loss of electrical service. Gas mains were not affected by storm surge and waves, but there was some damage to regulator stations throughout the surge and waves impact zone in Mississippi. Although the gas distribution system was not damaged, selective system shutdowns were necessary to stem the uncontrolled venting of gas to the atmosphere at damaged homes and businesses.

Chemical Industry:

The regions affected by Hurricanes Katrina are major centers of the petro-chemical industry, with exploration, production, and refining of oil and gas and associated industries lining the coast of Mississippi, Louisiana, and east Texas.

Damage to the wall insulation of tanks was observed in many plants along the Texas and Alabama coastline.

Structural failure of tanks was common in farms located in the vicinity of the landfall area of Hurricane Katrina. Cooling towers at oil refineries, chemical plants, and power stations were extensively damaged. The shrouds, typically constructed of fiberglass, sit atop a timber or metal structure, and many were observed to have failed.

Emergency service:

After Hurricane Katrina made landfall, rising floodwaters stranded thousands in New Orleans on rooftops, requiring a massive civil search and rescue operation. The Coast Guard, FEMA Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Task Forces,33 and DOD forces, in concert with State and local emergency responders from across the country, courageously combined to rescue tens of thousands of people. With extraordinary ingenuity and tenacity, Federal, State, and local emergency responders plucked people from rooftops while avoiding urban hazards not normally encountered during waterborne rescue.

      Lacking an integrated search and rescue incident command, the various agencies were unable to effectively coordinate their operations. This meant that multiple rescue teams were sent to the same areas, while leaving others uncovered. When successful rescues were made, there was no formal direction on where to take those rescued. Too often rescuers had to leave victims at drop-off points and landing zones that had insufficient logistics, medical, and communications resources, such as atop the I-10 cloverleaf near the Superdome.

Health Care:

Hurricane Katrina created enormous public health and medical challenges, especially in Louisiana and Mississippi—States with public health infrastructures that ranked 49th and 50th in the Nation, respectively. But it was the subsequent flooding of New Orleans that imposed catastrophic public health conditions on the people of southern Louisiana and forced an unprecedented mobilization of Federal public health and medical assets. Tens of thousands of people required medical care. Over 200,000 people with chronic medical conditions, displaced by the storm and isolated by the flooding, found themselves without access to their usual medications and sources of medical care. Several large hospitals were totally destroyed and many others were rendered inoperable. Nearly all smaller health care facilities were shut down. Although public health and medical support efforts restored the capabilities of many of these facilities, the region’s health care infrastructure sustained extraordinary damage. Most local and State public health and medical assets were overwhelmed by these conditions, placing even greater responsibility on federally deployed personnel. Immediate challenges included the identification, triage and treatment of acutely sick and injured patients; the management of chronic medical conditions in large numbers of evacuees with special health care needs; the assessment, communication and mitigation of public health risk; and the provision of assistance to State and local health officials to quickly reestablish health care delivery systems and public health infrastructures.

    Despite the success of Federal, State, and local personnel in meeting this enormous challenge, obstacles at all levels reduced the reach and efficiency of public health and medical support efforts. In addition, the coordination of Federal assets within and across agencies was poor. The cumbersome process for the authorization of reimbursement for medical and public health services provided by Federal agencies created substantial delays and frustration among health care providers, patients and the general public. In some cases, significant delays slowed the arrival of Federal assets to critical locations. In other cases, large numbers of Federal assets were deployed, only to be grossly underutilized.

Food & Agriculture:

Prior to Katrina making landfall, the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) had proactively pre-positioned food in warehouses in Louisiana and Texas, making the food readily available for disaster meal service programs. FNS continued its efforts to ensure adequate supplies of food were on hand or nearby by airlifting initial supplies of infant formula and baby food products to Louisiana, Texas, Alabama and Mississippi and then following up with additional baby food supplies for delivery via land transportation (this amounted to approximately two million pounds). Additional commodities (approximately twenty million pounds), that included fruits, juices, vegetables, meats and grains, were also procured and/or diverted from existing USDA and other state sources to assist with congregate meal service and provide families with food packages until the Disaster Food Stamp Program could provide food relief (certain locations in the hardest hit areas could not operate the Disaster Food Stamp Program because there were no retail outlets available). Additionally, schools outside the devastated areas were granted waivers which permitted the service of free meals to children who had fled the devastated areas and began attending school elsewhere. FNS also promptly implemented the Food Stamp Program’s first National Evacuee Policies that enabled State agencies that were not affected by the hurricane or that were not administering a disaster program to immediately issue disaster benefits to individuals and families who evacuated to their States. FNS approved over seventy waivers to affected States to issue benefits under the disaster authority. FNS also expanded the range of foods that could be purchased with food stamps in Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, and Texas, and approved alternate procedures for use and replacement of food stamp benefit cards to improve a household’s ability to purchase food.

    Agricultural producers from the states directly impacted by Katrina have suffered economic losses, although this varies greatly by crop and locality. Preliminary estimates by USDA economists project that the greatest farm production losses caused by Hurricane Katrina are likely to be to the crops of sugar cane, cotton, corn and soybeans in Mississippi, Louisiana and Alabama, and nursery and greenhouse products in Florida. Dairy and poultry production appear to have suffered losses due to the power cut-off following the hurricane.

    Orleans is a major gateway for U.S. oil imports and agricultural exports, especially corn, soybeans, wheat, and rice. Hurricane damage brought a halt to the flow of agricultural trade through New Orleans which resulted in falling commodity prices in interior states that depend on the Mississippi River waterway to move exports through New Orleans to international markets.

Defense:

Some military bases were hit Katrina, Keesler Air Force Base, Miss., appears to have received the heaviest damage after taking a direct hit from the Category 4 hurricane.

Nearly 700 Marines and almost 1,400 of their family members were evacuated from Marine Forces Reserve Headquarters New Orleans, leaving only essential personnel behind.

2. Event effect on critical infrastructure

The Effect on the August 2005 Hurricane Katrina is summarized in the table below:

3. Representative organization: The Port of New Orleans

The Port of New Orleans is the 5th largest port in the United States based on volume of cargo handled and 12th largest in the United States based on value of cargo. The port serves as the focal point for waterborne transportation of cargo to 28 states, and its cargo activity supported $37 billion in economic benefits the country and generated $2.8 billion in Federal tax revenue.

 The port is home to the longest wharf in the world, which is 2.1 miles long and can accommodate 15 vessels at a time.

   The Port of New Orleans is the only deep-water port in the United States served by six Class I railroads. The port is the principal gateway in the United States for rubber imports and is a major transshipment point for steel, grain, coffee, chemicals, cocoa beans, and petroleum. Over 2,000 vessels from nearly 60 nations dock at the port annually. Additionally, 700,000 passengers sail from the port to destinations in the Caribbean Sea, Mexico, and up the Mississippi River in either cruise ships or steamboats. The port handles more trade with Latin America than does any other U.S. gateway, including Miami. New Orleans also is a busy port for inland barge shipments that use the nation’s two main inland waterways, the Mississippi River and the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, which meet at New Orleans.

      Parts of the Port of New Orleans were heavily damaged by Hurricane Katrina. Although the main portion of the port, from the central business district to the Uptown neighborhood, incurred only minor to moderate wind damage, practically all facilities on the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal (Industrial Canal) were lost. Among the nine businesses most affected were U.S. Gypsum (with roughly 9,000 jobs located in the area), Lone Star Cement, and New Orleans Cold Storage, which is the nation’s largest poultry exporter.

     Although reports originally forecast that it would take six months to reopen the port, an impressive effort by local authorities and dockworkers reopened the port on September 12, only two weeks after the storm. By January 2006, the port was reported operating at more than 70 percent capacity.

Port of New Orleans Supply Chain Functions

Port of New Orleans can be mapped to the 5 supply chain main functions:

Inbound/Outbound functions– represent the interfaces that the organization is having with either its suppliers (1) or its Consumers (5).

That includes activities involved with supply of services, man power, raw materials, infrastructure, information and knowledge from various suppliers to Port of New-Orleans[1]. It also related to PONO consumers.

Inbound functions – represents the organization’s internal functions for making and distributing its products and/or services.

    That includes the functions that are associated with the Manufacturing (2) of freight services in the port and Distribution (3) of cargo through Retailers (4) to the Consumer (5)

PONO Supply chain SCOR

The following SCOR matrix exhibits PONO supply chain activities:

4.Event effect on organization’ SCM functions and activities

The effect of Hurricane Katrina on each of PONO supply chain functions and activities is showed below:

5. Risk management analysis.

Port of New Orleans is located on the coast of the hurricane-prone Gulf of Mexico and at the mouth of the Mississippi watershed, which drains over 40% of the continental U. S. There is no remedy for the natural forces that cause coastal storms and flooding. This threat is compounded by the State’s historic reliance on engineered flood protection measures; particularly systems of levees and floodwalls, as well as systems of canals, pipes and pumps also known as forced drainage systems. These measures provide single lines of defense against hazards and if or when they rail it can result in catastrophe. Meanwhile, manmade and natural hazards are combining to potentially make these events more common and more severe.

   A risk assessments and planning is crucial for trying to reduce and control future damage to critical infrastructure such as Port of New-Orleans. The following table presents the risk analysis for the supply chain functions and activities in PONO as result of a Hurricane.

 

References:

• Balis, C.V and Tinsley, W.J. (2006), “Supply chain security: mapping and assessing security threats across the supply chain“, The Avascent Review, No. 12, pp 1-9.

• Bichou, K. and Gray, R., (2004),” A logistics and supply chain management approach to port performance measurement“, Maritime Policy and Management, 31 (1), pp.47-67

• Board of Commissioners Port of New Orleans, (2008), “2020 Master plan: Charting the Future of the Port of New Orleans”, Louisiana.

•  Board of Commissioners Port of New Orleans, (2009), “Board of Commissioners Port of New Orleans Hazard Mitigation Plan“, Louisiana.

• Burton, M.L. and Hicks, M.J. (2005),” Hurricane Katrina: Preliminary Estimates of Commercial and Public Sector Damages” Marshall University: Center for Business and Economic Research, September, pp. 1-13.           

• Cashell, B.W. and Labonte, M. (2005),”The macroeconomic effects of Hurricane Katrina“, Congressional Research Service, RS22260, pp. 1-6.

• Chite, R.M. and Schnepf, R. and (2005), “U.S. Agriculture after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Status and Issues”, Congressional Research Service, RL33075, pp. 1-18.

• Comfort, L.K. (2006), “CITIES AT RISK: Hurricane Katrina and the Drowning of New Orleans“, Urban Affairs Review, Vol. 41, Issue 4, pp. 501-516.

• Cowie J., Popescu A., Underwood T. (2005), “Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Internet infrastructure“, Renesys, . / 13.01.2012.

• Fawcett, J.A. (Ed) (2007),” Port Continuity Planning: Maintaining the Region’s Economic Lifeblood, Proceedings of a Conference on Maritime Cargo Security “, USC Sea Grant Technical Report, USCSG-TR-04-2007). Los Angeles: University of Southern California Sea Grant Program. pp. 67-82.

• Gray, B.H. and Hebert K. (2006), “Hospitals in Hurricane Katrina: Challenges Facing Custodial Institutions in a Disaster“, Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved“, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 283-298.

• Grenzeback, L. R., and Lukmann, A.T. (2007), “Case Study of the Transportation Sector’s Response to and Recovery from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita“. Cambridge Systematic, Inc., Jan. 10.pp. 1-44.

• Grossi, P. and Ward, R.E.T. (2007), “Flood risk in New Orleans: implications for future management”, Geophysical research abstracts, Vol. 9, pp. 1-36.

• Hoffman, H. (Ed) (2006), “HURRICANE KATRINA AFTER ACTION REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS. Emergency Support Function 8 Health & Medical State of Mississippi”, North Carolina division of emergency medical services.

• Lasley, C.B., Simpson, D.M., Rockaway, T.D. and Weigel, T. (2007), ” Understanding critical infrastructure failure: Examining the experience of Biloxi and Gulfport, Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina”, International Journal of Critical Infrastructures, Vol. 6, Issue: 3, pp. 246-276.

• NIST Technical Note (2006).”Performance of Physical Structures in Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita: A Reconnaissance Report, National Institute of Standards and Technology”, 1476, pp. 1-270.

• Port Risk Management, (2007), “Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery” GAO-07-412, pp. 1-57.

• Statement of LaGrange, G. P. (Testimony before the Committee on Finance United States Senate) (2005) “Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Community Rebuilding Needs and Effectiveness of Past Proposals“, Washington.

• Townsend, F.F. (Ed) (2006), “The Federal response to hurricane Katrina: lesson learned”, the white house, Washington DC.

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